Τετάρτη, 5 Ιουνίου 2013

Διασώστες των χωρών - παρετάτε

ο τίτλος είναι εμπνευσμένος από τη πρόσφατη ανάρτηση με τίτλο προλετάριοι παρετάτε του συνμπλογγερ στροβολιώτη.

Είναι ένα άρθρο της wall stree journal η οποία ισχυρίζεται ότι είδε ένα έγγραφο του ΔΝΤ το οποίο παραδέχεται ότι εκάμαν τα μάτσιες στην ελλάδα. Αφήνει απανωτές μπηχτές στην κομισσιόν (τωρά που το πλοίο βουλιάζει ο κάθενας φκάλει τον νούρο του πόξω.....)
Το παραθέτω ως "τροφή για σκέψη" ή
 πέρκει ακούσει κανένας τωρά που δεν τα λεν οι ιδεολογικά αγγυλωμένοι ή
για να ξέρουμε τι μας περιμένει ή
να μεν το πω ότι εμείς ελαλούσαμεν σας τα ; Εν τζαι έθελεν ιδιαίτερη εξυπνάδα να το καταλάβεις ότι δεν θα φκαίνε.... Οι υπογραμίσεις , επιχρωματώσεις και σχόλια δικά μου....

 

IMF to Admit Mistakes on Greece Bailout

BRUSSELS—The International Monetary Fund is set to admit to major missteps over the past three years in its handling of the bailout of Greece, the first spark in a debt crisis that spread across Europe.

 
 
In an internal document marked "strictly confidential," the IMF said it badly underestimated the damage that its prescriptions of austerity would do to Greece's economy, which has been mired in recession for years.

But the fund also stressed that the response to the crisis, coordinated with the European Union, bought time to limit the fallout for the rest of the 17-nation euro area.

The IMF said that it bent its own rules to make Greece's burgeoning debt seem sustainable and that, in retrospect, the country failed on three of the four IMF criteria to qualify for assistance.

A version of the document, prepared by IMF staff and seen by The Wall Street Journal, was expected to be released publicly by the Washington-based fund on Thursday.

Over the last three years, a number of senior IMF figures, including the current managing director Christine Lagarde, have repeatedly said that the country's debt level was "sustainable"—likely to be repaid in full and on time. (οπόταν ακούτε πολλά τζαι πιστέφκετε λία)

But the document described the uncertainties around the Greek rescue as "so significant that staff was unable to vouch that public debt was sustainable with a high probability."

The IMF also said that it was too optimistic about the Greek government's prospects for a return to market financing and its political ability to implement the conditions of its rescue program.

An IMF spokesman declined to comment on the report, as did the Greek Finance Ministry.

Earlier this year Greek Finance Minister Yannis Stournaras did ask the IMF to explain why its past economic forecasts of the Greek austerity measures and their impact on the economy had been so off target.

The document is the most significant in a series of IMF analyses over the past few months that attempt to assess the institution's involvement in the euro-zone financial crisis.

The greater beneficiary of the 2010 bailout wasn't so much Greece as the wider euro-zone, the document suggested. (έ όχι !!!)

It described the rescue as a "holding operation" that "gave the euro area time to build a firewall to protect other vulnerable members and averted potentially severe effects on the global economy."

The IMF joined forces with the European Commission and the European Central Bank in 2010, forming the so-called troika, to manage Greece's first bailout of €110 billion ($143 billion)—one of the largest international rescues ever.

The three continued to run the country's second bailout, which came in 2012. Beyond Greece, the troika is managing the Irish, Portuguese and Cypriot bailouts. (λέτε να εμάθαν;)

While the fund has been scaling back its new financial commitments to euro-zone economies, it has put up a total of $47 billion for Greece, the biggest loan the IMF has ever made when compared with the size of a country's economy.

The fund criticized the delay restructuring Greece's massive debt load, which eventually came in May 2012, two years after the initial bailout. But it conceded that cutting it before then was "politically difficult" because of resistance from some euro-area countries whose banks held too much Greek government debt.  (ώστε οι τράπεζες α ; Μα παναγιά μου εν ριζοσπάστη που θκιεβάζω όξα αυγή ; Τζαι ουλλη τζίηνη η φρενίτιδα που εδημιουργήσαν στους λαούς της ευρώπης ενάντια στους έλληνες που πάει ; )

These countries were also concerned that cutting Greece's debt would lead the country to relax on overhauling its economy, it said.

An immediate restructuring would have been cheaper for European taxpayers, as private-sector creditors were repaid in full for two years before 2012 using the money borrowed by Athens. Greece's debt level thus remained undented, but it was now owed to the IMF and euro-zone taxpayers instead of banks and hedge funds.
Αυτή η παράγραφος αν άλλαζες λίον το λεξιλόγιο θα έλεγες ότι είναι μια καθαρά ταξική ανάλυση.


The IMF also said its own analysis of the future development of debt was wrong "by a large margin." The fund's debt-sustainability analysis—a critical piece of forecasting—"included stress tests but these turned out to be mild compared with actual outcomes."

The issue of the so-called fiscal multiplier—an estimate of how much an economy will contract for every euro in spending cuts or tax increases—has become part of the government's arsenal in its negotiations with the troika.

In talks with visiting troika officials in Athens next week, Greece will ask for permission to cut certain value-added, or sales taxes, arguing that an increase in restaurant taxes, for example, has generated less revenue not more by crimping spending.

Conversely a cut in the tax rate for eateries, the government says, could actually boost revenue by drawing in more diners. So far, however, officials at the European Commission have been cool to the idea.

The European Commission, which is the European Union's Brussels-based executive, comes in for special criticism in the IMF document. (έτες μπηχτές αρκέψασιν)

The report says the commission "tended to draw up policy positions by consensus, had enjoyed limited success with implementing [fiscal conditions]…and had no experience with crisis management."

It adds that the commission focused more on "compliance with EU norms than on growth impact" and "wasn't able to contribute much to identifying growth enhancing structural reforms." (με δικό μας λεξιλόγιο θα τους ελέαμεν ανίκανους)

The European Commission is the lead EU institution tasked with designing and promoting growth-enhancing and job-creating policies for the entire bloc. A commission spokesman didn't immediately respond to requests for comment.

"None of the [troika] partners seemed to view the arrangement as ideal," the paper continued in a section discussing the "unusual" arrangement, noting that there were "marked differences of view within the troika, particularly with regard to the growth projections."

Those growth projections were wildly off the mark but Greece still had to meet the same targets of cutting deficit, it said. "The fiscal targets became even more ambitious once the downturn exceeded expectations. In addition, the starting point moved."

The paper added that the targets and the underlying macroeconomic projections weren't revised to reflect what was actually happening in Greece for 18 months, until December 2011. (δεν εχρειάζετουν καλέ.... μια είναι η θεωρεία και είναι σωστή.... εξάλου εναλακτική δεν έσσιει οπόταν ;....)

The IMF had originally projected Greece would lose 5.5% of its economic output between 2009 and 2012. The country has lost 17% in real gross domestic output instead. The bailout plan predicted a 15% unemployment rate in 2012. It was 25%(τζαι ύστερα λαλούν ότι ο σταυράκης επρόβλεψεν έλλειμα 4 τζαι τελικά ήταν 6..... ε για τούτους ίντα που πρέπει να πεις ; )

However, slowing the pace of austerity would have helped Greece's economy, but wasn't politically possible, the fund said.

"While earlier adjustment of the targets could have tempered the contraction, the program would have then required additional financing," the document said. It stressed that neither it nor euro-area governments were prepared to lend more at that time.

The paper criticized Greek governments for failing to implement structural economic changes that could have propped up the private sector and said the pain of the adjustment was "unevenly spread across society." (να τα πει τζαι το δουνουττου πέρκει ακούσει κανένας)

But it said there were few precedents for the size of the spending cuts and tax increases that Greece implemented to hit the bailout targets.

The fund didn't explain why it made the choices it did in detail, nor why it agreed to troika analyses that it now says were incorrect.  (ε, καλά τζαι συ δημοσιογράφε ζητάς πολλά) But it said IMF staff "explicitly flagged" risks in the Greek program implementation.
—Alkman Granitsas in Athens contributed to this article.

πηγή : http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324299104578527202781667088.html?mod=WSJEurope_hpp_LEFTTopStories

τι άλλο να πεις ;